Subnational Environmental Constitutionalism and Reform in New York State by May, James R.
Pace Law Review 
Volume 38 
Issue 1 Symposium Edition 2017 Article 8 
September 2017 
Subnational Environmental Constitutionalism and Reform in New 
York State 
James R. May 
Widener University, Delaware Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Natural Resources Law 
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James R. May, Subnational Environmental Constitutionalism and Reform in New York State, 38 
Pace L. Rev. 121 (2017) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more 
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
MAY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/17 10:10 PM 
 
121 
Subnational Environmental Constitutionalism 
and Reform in New York State 
 
By James R. May* 
 
The State of New York’s constitution was perhaps the first 
in the world to embody environmental constitutionalism, most 
directly in what is known as its “Forever Wild” mandate from 
1894, which provides: 
The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter 
acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now 
fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest 
lands.  They shall not be leased, sold or 
exchanged, or be taken by any corporation, public 
or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold, 
removed or destroyed.1 
In contrast to many subnational environmental provisions, 
courts in New York have regularly enforced Forever Wild.2  New 
York’s Constitution also contains a remarkable mandate that 
every twenty years voters decide whether to hold elections for 
delegates to convene a convention to amend the state’s charter.3  
 
*  Distinguished Professor of Law, Widener University Delaware Law School.  
Portions of this article are adapted from JAMES R. MAY & ERIN DALY, GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
reprinted with permission of copyright holder and author. 
1. N.Y CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (originally Art. VII, Sec. 7); 
Nicholas A. Robinson, “Forever Wild”: New York’s Constitutional 
Mandates to Enhance the Forest Preserve 7-8 (Feb. 15, 2007), 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1283&context=la
wfaculty. 
2. See, e.g., Ass’n for Prot. of Adirondacks v. MacDonald, 170 N.E. 902, 
905 (N.Y. 1930) (holding that timber harvesting is inconsistent with “Forever 
Wild” portion of New York State Constitution). 
3. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2:  
At the general election to be held . . . every twentieth year . . . 
the question “Shall there be a convention to revise the 
constitution and amend the same?” shall be submitted to and 
decided by the electors of the state; and in case a majority of 
the electors voting thereon shall decide in favor of a 
convention for such purpose, the electors of every senate 
district . . . shall elect three delegates . . . [who] shall 
1
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The next such referendum is November 7, 2017, and if it carries, 
the state will hold its next constitutional convention in 2019.4 
With the potential for a constitutional convention comes the 
potential reexamination of the role of environmental 
constitutionalism, including the Forever Wild provision.5  Some 
welcome the opportunity for a convention as an opportunity to 
advance environmental constitutionalism, including 
instantiating fundamental environmental rights: 
[T]here is a compelling case for amending the New 
York Constitution to provide for a right to the 
environment.  If not enacted via a convention, the 
option exists for the legislature to adopt an 
environmental right to submit to the voters.  
Either way, New York deserves to recognize the 
right to the environment.6 
 Others are skeptical, concerned “that a convention would 
tamper with the “forever wild” guarantees.”7  If New York 
amends its constitution to incorporate additional provisions that 
provide for environmental rights, duties, responsibilities, and 
remedies, it will hardly be alone.  Environmental 
constitutionalism enjoys global ubiquity.  About half of the 
world’s constitutions guarantee a substantive right to a clean or 
quality or healthy environment explicitly or implicitly, and 
about half of those also guarantee procedural rights to 
 
convene . . . on the first Tuesday of April next ensuing after 
their election . . . [and] [a]ny proposed constitution . . . shall 
be submitted to a vote . . . not less than six weeks after the 
adjournment of such convention. 
 Id.  See generally PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF NEW YORK (1996) (discussing the history and significance of New 
York’s constitution). 
4. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2.  See Peter J. Galie & Gerald Benjamin, 
Introduction, in NEW YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS 
AND THE PATH TO RENEWED GREATNESS 1, 1-33 (Peter J. Galie, Christopher 
Bopst & Gerald Benjamin eds., 2016) [hereinafter NEW YORK’S BROKEN 
CONSTITUTION], for a discussion on needed reform constitutional reform. 
5. See COMM. ON THE N.Y. STATE CONST., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, THE 
CONSERVATION ARTICLE IN THE STATE CONSTITUTION (ARTICLE XIV) 1-6 (2016). 
6. Nicholas Robinson, Updating New York’s Constitutional 
Environmental Rights, 38 PACE L. REV. 152, 181 (2017). 
7. Id. at 177. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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information, participation or access to justice in environmental 
matters.8  Nearly seventy constitutions specify that individuals 
have responsibilities or duties to protect the environment9 and 
others include directive principles of state policy.  A few national 
constitutions address specific environmental endowments 
including water, flora, and fauna, while others define the 
environment in certain ways, including as a public trust or in 
terms of sustainable development.10 
What is often overlooked is the extent to which some state 
constitutions in federal systems—including Germany, Brazil, 
and the United States—include environmental provisions, some 
of which are even more elaborate than their counterparts at the 
national level.11  Indeed, especially in the age of climate change 
denial and the anthropocene, subnational government—states, 
 
8. See, e.g., JAMES R. MAY & ERIN DALY, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2016) [hereinafter GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM]; James R. May, Symposium on Global Environmental 
Constitutionalism: An Introduction and Overview, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 139 
(2015); Erin Daly & James R. May, Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania: A 
Model for Environmental Constitutionalism, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 151 (2015); 
Erin Daly & James R. May, Comparative Environmental Constitutionalism, 6 
JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 9 (2015); James R. May, Constitutional Directions in 
Procedural Environmental Rights, 28 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 27 (2013); James R. 
May & Erin Daly, Constitutional Environmental Rights and Liabilities, 3 
ENVTL. LIABILITY 75 (2012); James R. May & Erin Daly, New Directions in 
Earth Rights, Environmental Rights and Human Rights: Six Facets of 
Constitutionally Embedded Environmental Rights Worldwide, 1 IUCN ACAD. 
ENVTL. L. E-J. (2011); see also LOUIS KOTZE, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ANTHROPOCENE (2017), DAVID R. BOYD, THE RIGHT 
TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT: REVITALIZING CANADA’S CONSTITUTION 65 (2012); 
RICHARD P. HISKES, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A GREEN FUTURE: ENVIRONMENTAL 
RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE (2009); TIM HAYWARD, 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS (2005). 
9. See, e.g., BENIN CONST. art. 27 (“Every person has the right to a healthy, 
satisfying, and lasting environment and has the duty to defend it.  The state 
shall watch over the protection of the environment.”); CHECHNYA CONST. art. 
55 (“Everyone is obliged to preserve nature and prevent damages, as well as to 
be careful with removing natural riches.”); INDIA CONST. art. 51A (“It shall be 
the duty of every citizen of India . . . to protect and improve the natural 
environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have 
compassion for living creatures . . . .”).  
10. See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at 
260-269, for a more in-depth discussion. 
11. See id. at 236-254; see also James R. May & William Romanowicz, 
Environmental Rights in State Constitutions, in PRINCIPLES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 305, 306-307 (James R. May, ed., 2011). 
3
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provinces, Länder, cantons, or what is sometimes referred to as 
the meso-level, which exists between the national government 
and local governments—are the final frontier in constitutional 
environmental rights.12  Subnational constitutionalism is 
worldwide, advancing myriad civil, political and socio-economic 
rights, and often filling gaps in federal systems.13  Many 
subnational governments have their own constitutions, which 
can provide the most direct mechanism for advancing local 
interests, including environmental constitutionalism.14  Led by 
states in the Americas in general, and Brazil in particular, 
subnational governments around the globe have seen fit to 
constitutionalize substantive and procedural environmental 
rights, environmental duties, and sustainable development for 
present and future generations, often with much more specificity 
and enforceability than provided in national constitutions.  
Subnational instantiation of constitutional environmental 
rights can have special salience in countries that have yet to 
recognize environmental rights at the federal level, including 
the United States, Canada, and Australia.  New York has much 
to learn from subnational experiences in environmental 
constitutionalism elsewhere.  
This article has three parts.  Part I provides a primer to the 
field of subnational environmental constitutionalism.  Part II 
explores the opportunities and challenges in enforcing existing 
subnational environmental provisions.  Part III then examines 
a case study involving language to consider at a constitutional 
convention for the State of New York. 
 
I. A Primer on Subnational Environmental Constitutionalism 
 
Subnational provisions stand apart from their national 
counterparts, if any, and warrant independent examination.  
Subnational developments at the constitutional and judicial 
 
12. James A. Gardner, In Search of Subnational Constitutionalism 1-2 
(Buff. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 2007-016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017239. 
13. See Sylvia Ewald, Note, State Court Adjudication of Environmental 
Rights: Lessons from the Adjudication of the Right to Education and the Right 
to Welfare, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 414-417 (2011). 
14. See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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levels can be instructive and illustrative.  For example, some 
environmental constitutional provisions are much more 
elaborate and intricate than national analogs. Developments at 
the state level can be thought of as “happy incidents” to advance 
innovations in law, including in constitutional law and 
environmental constitutionalism. Brown for one contends that 
experiences in U.S. states with environmental constitutionalism 
could provide Eastern Europeans with models for making such 
environmental provisions self-executing and enforceable.15 
Unfortunately, judicial developments at the state level in 
the United States have not been terribly encouraging, as 
Thompson has observed: “[s]tate courts also have helped ease 
most of the constitutional provisions into relative obscurity by 
holding that the provisions are not self-executing, by denying 
standing to private citizens and groups trying to enforce the 
provisions, or by establishing relatively easy standards for 
meeting the constitutional requirements.”16  Nonetheless, 
subnational constitutions can provide the additional proving 
ground for environmental constitutionalism around the globe 
because such provisions (if they exist) tend to supply a vital link 
to the dual objectives of protecting the environment and 
promoting environmental human rights. 
 
A.  The Extent of Subnational Environmental 
Constitutionalism 
 
Subnational environmental constitutionalism enjoys—or 
suffers—from many of the same attributes as does its national 
counterpart.  Yet it offers largely untapped opportunities to 
embed substantive, procedural and other environmental rights 
in ways most likely to have the greatest effect at the local level, 
where environmental degradation is most likely to be sustained 
and where its effects are most likely to be experienced by people 
 
15. See Elizabeth F. Brown, Comment, In Defense of Environmental 
Rights in East European Constitutions, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 191, 
191-192. 
16. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the 
Environment: The History and Future of Montana’s Environmental Provisions, 
64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 158 (2003) [hereinafter Thompson, Montana’s 
Environmental Provisions]. 
5
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in their communities. 
Subnational environmental constitutionalism offers several 
advantages over national treatment.  First, subnational 
constitutions can reflect local environmental concerns that can 
be ignored or underserved by the national constitution, even 
when those concerns may address global challenges.  For 
example, the Dutch provinces of Zeeland, North Holland, 
Friesland, and Groningen address climate change and 
sustainable development, problems that the national 
constitution does not reach.17 
Second, subnational constitutions can pay attention to 
minutiae often lacking in national constitutions.  Remarkable 
examples of this are found in Brazil, whose state constitutions 
delineate extensive governmental functions in the service of 
substantive environmental rights, including promoting 
biodiversity and sustainability, protecting species and water 
quality, advancing conservation and environmental education, 
and enforcing environmental requirements.  The constitution of 
the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso—which contains agricultural 
land, part of the Amazon forest, and part of the Pantanal, one of 
the world’s largest wetlands—is typical in this regard.  To 
“ensure the effectiveness” of substantive environmental rights 
there, it impels the subnational government to: 
4 Safeguard the rational and sustainable use of natural 
resources to ensure its perpetuation and minimize 
environmental impact; 
4 Preserve the diversity and integrity of the genetic 
heritage; 
4 Establish the state policy of sanitation and water 
resources; 
4 Require, for the installation of work or activity that may 
potentially cause significant degradation of the 
environment, a prior environmental impact study, 
which shall be made public, guaranteed the community 
participation through public hearings and their 
 
17. See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at 
211. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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representatives at all stages; 
4 Fight pollution and erosion; 
4 Inform, systematic and broadly, the population about 
pollution levels, the quality of the environment, 
situations that risk accidents, the presence of 
substances potentially harmful to health in drinking 
water and food, as well as the results of audits and 
monitoring; 
4 Promote environmental education at all school levels 
and public awareness for the preservation of the 
environment; 
4 Stimulate and promote the restoration of native 
vegetation coverage in degraded areas, aiming at the 
achievement of minimum standards necessary to 
maintain the ecological balance; 
4 Protect the fauna and flora, ensuring the diversity of 
species and ecosystems, with prohibition, in the manner 
prescribed by law, to practices that endanger their 
ecological function and cause the extinction of species or 
subject animals to cruelty; 
4 Create, deploy and manage state and local conservation 
units representative of existing ecosystems in the State, 
restoring its essential ecological processes, and the 
alteration and suppression may only be allowed by law, 
with prohibition to any use that compromises the 
integrity of the attributes that justify its protection; 
4 Control and regulate, where applicable, the production, 
sale, and use of techniques, methods, and substances 
that represent a risk to life, quality of life and the 
environment; 
4 Relate the participation in biddings, access to tax 
benefits, and official credit lines to environmental 
compliance, certified by the competent agency; 
4 Define, create and maintain, in the manner required by 
law, vital areas for the protection of natural caves, 
archaeological sites, remarkable natural landscapes, 
7
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other assets of historical, touristic, scientific and 
cultural value; 
4 Define territorial spaces and their components to be 
specially designed for the creation of protected 
environmental areas and preserved goods of cultural 
value as a historic site; 
4 Promote anthropogenic and environmental zoning of its 
territory, establishing consistent and differentiated 
policies for the preservation of natural environments, 
striking landscapes, water sources, areas of ecological 
interest within the State, from a physiographic, 
ecological, water and biological standpoint; 
4 Promote technical and scientific studies aiming to 
recycle discarded raw materials, as well as encourage its 
application in economic activities; 
4 Stimulate research, development and use of alternative 
energy sources, clean and energy saving technologies; 
and 
4 Ensure, in the manner prescribed by law, free access to 
basic information about the environment.18 
Most Brazilian states similarly dictate governmental means 
for implementing substantive environmental rights, including 
the States of Amazonas, Bahia, Espírito Santo, Goiás, 
Maranhão, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Paraíba, Paraná, 
Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio Grande do Norte, 
Santa Catarina, Sergipe, and Tocantins, and in the Federal 
District. 
Third, subnational constitutions can combine multiple 
facets of environmental constitutionalism in a single swath, 
which can be more challenging at the national level due to the 
challenges outlined in Part I.  For example, Article 57 of the 
proposed Kurdish Regional Constitution of Iraq contains a 
cavalcade of environmental rights, including individual rights 
and responsibilities, governmental policies, and sustainability, 
in a sort of environmental omnibus provision, which provides: 
 
18. See id. at 219-21. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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First: Environmental protection (land, water, air, 
plants and animals) is a responsibility of all and if 
anyone causes damage to them, they are 
responsible to fix it and to be punished by law. 
Second: All citizens have a legitimate right for 
freedom and equality in an appropriate living 
status, in a social and economical environment 
which will provide a prosperous and happy life 
and has a responsibility for protecting the 
environment and improving it for the present and 
future generations. 
Third: The Regional Government shall take action 
to mitigate and treat the sources of pollution in 
the environment, and in regard to this it, strives 
to develop forests and protect the fields and 
protect the green zones inside the cities and their 
outskirts. The Regional Government shall 
develop, enlarge and construct public parks, 
natural parks for protecting animals, plants, and 
natural resources and prohibit buildings and 
institutions and the use of machines and 
instruments in the natural protectorates.19 
 As of 2013, this draft has not yet gone into effect, but as 
written, it stands as a model of the potential for environmental 
constitutionalism; this, despite the fact that control over the 
land and resources remains in dispute between the regional and 
national governments. 
Fourth, subnational environmental constitutionalism can 
provide enhanced opportunities for coordinated national-state 
implementation of national environmental policies.  For 
example, as Michael Kelly describes, the Kurdish Regional 
Constitution within the framework of the Iraqi Federal 
Constitution allows for shared responsibility for environmental 
policy.20  Kirsten Jörgensen notes that “[t]en out of the twenty-
 
19. See Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish Regional Constitution Within the 
Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution:  A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, 
Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 114 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 707, 784 (2010). 
20. Id. at 727-28. 
9
MAY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/17  10:10 PM 
130 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38:1 
eight states of India (Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, 
Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, West 
Bengal, Kerala, and Orissa) are implementing major wind 
energy programmes,” under the aegis of the federal 
constitution.21  At times, the allocation of responsibility for the 
environment between the local and the national government can 
give rise to political tensions and even military action when the 
local and national goals are at odds or when the revenues 
produced by exploitation of natural resources have to be 
equitably shared; most often, however, constitutional 
environmental provisions can promote inter-governmental 
cooperation. 
Such national-subnational coordination is fairly common. 
For example, states that make up the Ethiopian federation 
(Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, 
Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Regional 
State (SNNPRS), Somali, and Tigray), “share the . . . 
environmental policy objectives” reflected in the national 
constitution.22 
Other federal constitutions explicitly delegate 
environmental protection to subnational entities, including 
Spain,23 Germany, and the Netherlands.24  Hudson notes that 
the federal Canadian Constitution “contains explicit language 
 
21. Kirsten Jörgensen, Climate Initiatives at the Subnational Level of the 
Indian States and Their Interplay With Federal Policies (March 2011) 
(presented at the 2011 ISA Annual Convention), http://www.diss.fu-
berlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCS_derivate_0000000021
09/isa11_joergensen_draft.pdf. 
22. Tsegaye Regassa, Sub-National Constitutions in Ethiopia: Towards 
Entrenching Constitutionalism at State Level, 3 MIZAN L. REV. 33, 1-2, 51 n.85 
(2009). 
23. See Kelly, supra note 19, at 763-64. 
24. See Kirsten Jörgensen, Governance for Sustainable Development in 
the German Bundesländer, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SUBNATIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS: POLICY-MAKING AND MULTI-LEVEL INTERACTIONS 103, 109-15 
(Hans Bruyninckx et al., 2012) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT] (“As 
a result of the 2006 federalism reform, the distribution of powers has changed 
slightly to favor the Bundesländer.  This reform provided the Bundesländer 
the right to deviate from federal law in the areas of nature conservation, 
landscape planning, and water and flood water management . . . .”); Frans 
H.J.M. Coenen, Dutch Provincial Sustainable Development Policies: Ambitions 
and Differences, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 120, 121-25, 
132-34. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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granting exclusive regulatory authority over subnational forest 
policy to the provinces . . . . This is a significant state of affairs 
since the Canadian provinces actually own or otherwise control 
84 percent of the nation’s forests.”25  Indeed, the Constitution of 
Canada provides in pertinent part “[i]n each province, the 
legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to (a) 
exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province; 
(b) development, conservation and management of non-
renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the 
province, including laws in relation to the rate of primary 
production therefrom.”26 
Fifth, even failed attempts to instantiate constitutional 
environmental rights at the subnational level can contribute to 
the enactment of legislative measures to achieve the same ends.  
Boyd, for example, reports that negated efforts to advance 
environmental constitutionalism at the federal and provincial 
level in Canada contributed to the enactment of provincial 
legislation recognizing substantive environmental rights in the 
Northwest Territories, Nanavut, Ontario, Quebec, and the 
Yukon.27  Ontario’s legislatively-enacted environmental “Bill of 
Rights,” for instance, advances human and environmental rights 
at the local level.28 
Sixth, insofar as most citizens are mostly connected to their 
state government and state authority is more likely to be 
responsive to the needs of local communities, subnational 
constitutionalism affords greater opportunities for both political 
and legal action to enforce and promote environmental norms.  
Cusak observes that subnational environmental 
constitutionalism includes textual provisions “granting citizens 
the right to a healthful environment; public policy statements 
 
25. Blake Hudson, What Kind of Constitutional Design is Optimal for 
Environmental Governance?, ENVTL. L. PROFESSOR BLOG (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2012/02/what-kind-of-
constitutional-design-is-optimal-for-environmental-governance.html. 
26. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 
1985, app II, no 92A(1) (Can.). 
27. See BOYD, supra note 8, at 61-66. 
28. Id. at 63-65.  For a discussion of Ontario’s approach to environmental 
constitutionalism, see Sandra Walker, The Ontario Environmental Bill of 
Rights, in ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS: LAW, LITIGATION & ACCESS TO JUSTICE 20-
32 (Sven Deimann & Bernard Dyssli eds., 1995).   
11
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concerning preservation of natural resources; financial 
provisions for environmental programs; [and] clauses that 
restrict the environmental prerogatives of state legislatures.”29 
And finally, subnational environmental constitutionalism 
can provide experience in a country that can normalize 
environmental constitutionalism and goad activity at the 
national level.  This has happened in Argentina, where, as 
Hernandez notes, the Province of Córdoba’s constitutional 
environmental rights preceded those that followed at the 
national level.30 
 
B. Textual Subnational Environmental Constitutionalism 
 
Subnational environmental constitutionalism has gained a 
foothold throughout the globe, including in Austria, Argentina, 
Brazil, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iraq, Netherlands, the 
Philippines, and the United States.31 
The Brazilian brand of subnational environmental 
constitutionalism is especially striking.  Spurred on initially by 
the Rio Declaration in 1992 (and buffeted by the Rio+20 
Conference in 2012), the most ardent examples of subnational 
environmental constitutionalism occur at the state level in 
Brazil.32  The constitutions for all of Brazil’s twenty-six states—
 
29. Mary Ellen Cusack, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of State 
Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
173, 181 (1993); Barry E. Hill, Steve Wolfson & Nicholas Targ, Human Rights 
and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some Predictions, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. REV. 359, 390 (2004) (“Environmental constitutional provisions at the state 
level, however, have fared better than at the federal level. Every state 
constitution drafted after 1959 explicitly addresses ‘modern concerns’ 
regarding pollution control and preservation.  Indeed, fully one-third of all 
state constitutions include: (1) policy statements regarding the importance of 
environmental quality; (2) environmental enabling language; and/or (3) 
language creating an individual right to a clean and healthy environment.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
30. ANTONIO MARIA HERNANDEZ, SUB-NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
ARGENTINA 24 (2011). 
31.  Joseph Marko, Federalism, Sub-national Constitutionalism, and the 
Protection of Minorities, RUTGERS U. CTR. FOR ST. CONST. STUD. (2015), 
http://statecon.camden.rutgers.edu/sites/statecon/files/subpapers/marko.pdf 
(“Several land constitutions . . . contain provisions for the protection of the 
environment.”). 
32. United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, 
June 20-22, 2012, Rio+20 Outcome Document, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/288; United 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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and the Federal District—promote environmental protection, 
often elaborately and identically so.33  The Mato Grasso 
constitution is typical, touching all corners of environmental 
constitutionalism by guaranteeing substantive and procedural 
rights and imposing duties and responsibilities that apply to all 
for the benefit of present and future generations. 
Notably, the constitutions of most Brazilian states and the 
federal district embed a substantive right to a quality 
environment in some form, most commonly to a “balanced” 
environment.  For example, the constitution of the State of Acre 
provides that “[a]ll have the right to an ecologically balanced 
environment.”34  Amapá’s Constitution provides that “[a]ll have 
the right to an ecologically balanced environment, which is an 
asset of common use and essential to a healthy quality of life.”35  
Amazonas’ Constitution says that “[a]ll have the right to a 
balanced environment, essential to a healthy quality of life.”36  
Ceará’s Constitution refers to a “balanced environment” as an 
“inalienable right.”37  Goiás’ Constitution guarantees “an 
ecologically balanced environment.”  Mato Grosso’s Constitution 
says that: “[a]ll have the right to an ecologically balanced 
environment.”38  Maranhão’s Constitution calls a balanced 
environment “an asset of common use and essential to people’s 
quality of life, imposing to all, and especially the State and the 
Municipalities, the duty to ensure their preservation and 
restoration for the benefit of present generations and future.”39  
Similar provisions recognizing a substantive right to a balanced 
environment are found in the constitutions of the States of 
Bahia, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Maranhão, Minas Gerais, Paraíba, 
Paraná, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio Grande do 
 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, June 20-22, 2012, 
Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.215/16 (Sept. 28, 2012). 
33. See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at 
221-22. 
34. Id. at 225. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 225-26. 
38. See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at 
225-26. 
39. Id. 
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Norte, Santa Catarina, Sergipe, and the Tocantins, and in the 
Federal District.40  A couple of states vary slightly from the 
“balanced” formulae, including Mato Grosso Sol, which provides 
that “[a]ll have the right to enjoy an environment free of physical 
and social factors harmful to health.”41 
The constitutions of most Brazilian states express 
environmental rights in terms of duties and responsibilities that 
are owed by all for the benefit of present and future generations.  
For example, Espírito Santo’s constitution reads that: “[a]ll have 
the right to an ecologically, healthy and balanced environment, 
and it is incumbent upon them and in particular to the State and 
the Municipalities, to ensure its preservation, conservation and 
restoration for the benefit of present and future generations.”42  
Likewise, Mato Grasso’s Constitution imposes a duty on the 
state, municipalities, and “the community” “to defend and 
preserve” the environment “for present and future generations,” 
while Acre’s Constitution says that “both the State and the 
community shall defend [the environment] and preserve it for 
present and future generations,” and Amapá’s Constitution 
stating that “both the Government and the community shall 
have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future 
generations.”43 
The constitutions of some Brazilian states specifically 
elevate the interests of nature. For example, Bahia’s says that 
“[i]t is incumbent upon the State, beyond all powers that are not 
prohibited by the Federal Constitution, to . . . protect the 
environment and fight pollution in any of its forms, preserving 
the forests, fauna and flora.”44  It remains to be seen whether 
provisions such as this create a “right” on behalf of nature. 
Subnational deployment of environmental rights in the 
United States is instructive because it underscores both the 
potential and limitations of environmental constitutionalism.45  
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, at 
225-26. 
44. Id. 
45. See, e.g., Richard O. Brooks, A Constitutional Right to a Healthful 
Environment, 16 VT. L. REV. 1063, 1103-05 (1992) (supporting 
“decentralization” of constitutional provisions that address the environment, 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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While all efforts to amend the U.S. Constitution to recognize 
environmental rights have failed,46 states in the United States 
have a long tradition of constitutionalizing environmental 
protection.  Indeed, constitutional recognition of natural 
resources and the environment at the subnational level in the 
United States harkens back almost two centuries, beginning in 
1842 with Rhode Island’s protection of “all the rights of fishery, 
and the privileges of the shore . . . .”47 Among the more notable 
provisions is the “Wildlands Forever” provision of the New York 
State Constitution, which provides that: 
The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter 
acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now 
fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest 
lands.  They shall not be leased, sold or 
exchanged, or be taken by any corporation, public 
or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold, 
removed or destroyed.48 
 Presently, there are over two hundred natural resource or 
environment-related provisions in forty-six state constitutions.  
These provisions reach nineteen different categories of natural 
resources or the environment, including water, timber, and 
minerals.49  They also take eleven different forms, including 
 
observing “[s]tate judges [would] . . . be more sensitive in weighing the state’s 
environmental values.”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and 
State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS 
L.J. 863, 867 (1996) [hereinafter Thompson, Environmental Policy]; Janelle P. 
Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment: Enforcing 
Environmental Protection Through State and Federal Constitutions, 11 INT’L 
LEGAL PERSP. 185, 185-87 (1999); Thompson, Montana’s Environmental 
Provisions, supra note 16, at 174. 
46. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional 
Right to a Clean/Healthy Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013 (2004). 
47. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 17.  For a thorough history of the evolution 
of Rhode Island’s Constitution, see Kevin D. Leitao, Rhode Island’s Forgotten 
Bill of Rights, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 31, 58 n.68 (1996).  
48. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Ass’n for the Prot. of the 
Adirondacks v. MacDonald, 170 N.E. 902, 905 (N.Y. 1930) (timber harvesting 
inconsistent with “Forever Wild” portion of New York State Constitution).  
49. Bret Adams et al., Environmental and Natural Resources Provisions 
in State Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73, 74-75 (2002). The 
categories are: 
 
15
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general policy statements, legislative directives, and individual 
rights to a quality environment.50  States recognizing 
environmental protection as an overarching state policy include 
Louisiana,51 Michigan,52 Ohio,53 South Carolina,54 and 
Virginia.55  Several more address parochial environmental 
concerns, such as access to water, preservation, re-development, 
sustainability, pollution abatement, climate change, energy 
reform, or environmental rights.56  Dozens more contain 
 
(1) public land acquisition/preservation/management, (2) 
public ownership of land and other resources, (3) sovereignty 
issues, (4) use/development balance, (5) school trust lands, 
(6) public trust doctrine, (7) takings/eminent domain/conde
mnation power, (8) water access rights, (9) water rights, (10) 
water development and reclamation, (11) water resource 
protection, (12) mining and mineral rights, (13) fish and 
wildlife, (14) fishing access, (15) hunting and fishing 
restrictions, (16) rights of way, (17) timber and forest 
management, (18) nuclear power, and (19) agriculture.  
Id. at 74-75.  
50. Id. at 75.  The other manifestations include provisions respecting (1) 
legislative protection, (2) agency authority, (3) general financing, (4) taxing 
authority, (5) bonding authority, (6) funds and trust accounts, (7) educational 
programs, and (8) private liability.  Id. 
51. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The natural resources of the state, including 
air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the 
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible 
and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The 
legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.”). 
52. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 51 (“The legislature shall pass suitable laws 
for the protection and promotion of the public health.”). 
53. OHIO CONST. art VIII, §2q (“Environmental and related conservation, 
preservation, and revitalization purposes. . . are proper public purposes of the 
state and local governmental entities and are necessary and appropriate 
means to improve the quality of life and the general and economic well-being 
of the people of this state . . . .”). 
54. S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“The health, welfare, and safety of the lives 
and property of the people of this State and the conservation of its natural 
resources are matters of public concern.”). 
55. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“To the end that the people have clean air, pure 
water, and the use and enjoyment for recreation of adequate public lands, 
waters, and other natural resources, [and] its public lands . . . . Further it shall 
be the Commonwealth’s policy to protect the atmosphere, lands, and waters 
from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment, and 
general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.”). 
56. Of course, whether to categorize a constitutional provision as 
addressing the environmental or resources involves some measure of 
subjectivity. For example, Eurick, supra note 45, at 201, puts the number at 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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provisions fairly characterized as recognizing that the state 
holds state resources in “public trust.”57  Currently, five states 
instantiate a substantive right to a quality environment:58  
Hawaii,59 Illinois,60 Massachusetts,61 Montana,62 and 
Pennsylvania.63  These provisions are independent of state laws 
that allow citizens to enforce pollution control statutes.64 
While most provide a “right” to the “environment,” the 
adjectival objective – “clean” or “healthful” or “quality” – differs 
from state to state. For example, Hawaii’s and Montana’s 
Constitutions aim to afford a “clean and healthful 
environment,”65 Illinois’s “a right to a healthful environment,”66 
Massachusetts’s a “right to clean air and water, freedom from 
 
twenty-one. 
57. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public 
Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State 
Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, A 
Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public 
Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 
37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010). 
58. See Cusack supra note 29, at 181 (noting amendments to state 
constitutions include “those granting citizens the right to a healthful 
environment; public policy statements concerning preservation of natural 
resources; financial provisions for environmental programs; and clauses that 
restrict the environmental prerogatives of state legislatures.”); see also EDITH 
BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 416 
(1998) (identifying Illinois, Hawaii, California, Florida, Massachusetts, 
Montana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia as embedding 
environmental rights). 
59. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.   
60. See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2. 
61. See MASS. CONST. art. XCVII.  
62. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.  See generally Bryan P. Wilson, State 
Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial Activism: Is the Big Sky 
Falling?, 53 EMORY L.J. 627 (2004); Thompson, Montana’s Environmental 
Provisions, supra note 16, at 158 (discussing Montana’s finding of a 
fundamental right to a “healthful environment”). 
63. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
64. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution 
Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part I - An Interpretive 
Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICK. L. REV. 693 (1999) [hereinafter 
Dernbach I] (explaining purpose of provision).  
65. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9 (“Each person has the right to a clean and 
healthful environment.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (guaranteeing “right to 
clean and healthful environment . . . .”); see generally Wilson, supra note 62.   
66. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (“Each person has the right to a healthful 
environment.”).   
17
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excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, 
historic, and esthetic qualities of their environment,”67 and 
Pennsylvania’s “a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values 
of the environment.”68 
These provisions have been interpreted to require harm to 
humans.  For example, in Glisson v. City of Marion, the Supreme 
Court of Illinois explained that: “[t]he primary concern of the 
drafters . . . was the effect of pollution on the environment and 
human health.  The right to a ‘healthful environment’ was 
therefore not intended to include the protection of endangered 
and threatened species.”69  Yet Montana’s suggests biocentric 
concerns, choosing both “clean and healthful” over “healthful” 
out of concern that the latter would permit the environmental 
degradation of Montana’s most environmentally pristine areas 
so long as the pollution didn’t harm human health.70 
Of course, environmental constitutionalism has little 
traction in subnational governments that either lack a 
constitution or a bill of rights.  Super-subnational environmental 
constitutionalism by municipal and other local governmental 
entities is also trending upward, particularly in subnational 
governmental entities that operate under constitutional 
mandates to promote environmental interests.  Some of these 
provisions can be even more protective and expansive than what 
is typically found at the subnational and national levels, such 
as, for instance, those American cities whose charters protect 
rights of nature, including Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  A recent 
study reports that many cities in the Philippines, including 
Puerto Princesa, Naga, Quezon, and Makati Cities have adopted 
local constitutional action plans to address various 
environmental concerns, including climate change.71   
 
67. MASS. CONST. art. XCVII (“The people shall have the right to clean air 
and water . . . .”). 
68. PA. CONST. I, § 27 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, 
and the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the 
environment.”). 
69. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1042 (Ill. 1999). 
70. MONT. LEGISLATURE ET AL., 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
1971-1972 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1243-44 (1981). 
71. ATENEO SCH. OF GOV’T, STUDY ON CARBON GOVERNANCE AT SUB-
NATIONAL LEVEL IN THE PHILIPPINES (2011). 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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Such super-subnational constitutionalism offers additional 
and often unexercised potential for achieving environmental 
objectives.  In the United States, for example, as Professor 
Michelle Bryan Mudd observes: 
The local governments in environmental rights 
states are poised to become leaders in this 
endeavor by creating and implementing robust 
environmental land use provisions.  Yet that 
leadership has been lacking to date.  Whereas 
state agencies in Illinois, Pennsylvania, Montana, 
and Hawaii have integrated environmental 
review into selected areas of state purview, local 
governments continue to leave their 
environmental authority largely unexercised.72 
 
II. Judicial Receptivity to Subnational Constitutional 
Environmental Rights 
 
Constitutionally enshrined environmental standards at the 
subnational level are most effective when they are recognized 
enforced judicially.73  Yet amid the varied manifestations of 
constitutionally-embedded environmental provisions at the 
subnational level, one commonality stands out: they are seldom 
subject to substantive interpretation,74 leaving them dormant 
and awaiting clarity through advocacy.75  This dearth in 
applicable jurisprudence is likely due to judicial concerns about 
recognizing and enforcing emerging constitutional features,76 
 
72. Michelle Bryan Mudd, A “Constant and Difficult Task”: Making Local 
Land Use Decisions in States With a Constitutional Right to a Healthful 
Environment, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 61 (2011). 
73. For a general discussion of enforcement in this context, see John C. 
Tucker, Constitutional Codification of an Environmental Ethic, 52 FLA. L. REV.  
299 (2000).  
74. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 313 n.28 (Haw. 
2007) (explaining that, “[a]lthough this court has cited this amendment as 
support for our approach to standing in environmental cases . . . we have not 
directly interpreted the text of the amendment.”) (citations omitted)). 
75. Constitutional provisions referred to from hereon may be found in 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 8, app. at 281-358. 
76. See Robert A. McLaren, Environmental Protection Based on State 
Constitutional Law: A Call for Reinterpretation, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 123, 149-
150 (1990). 
19
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restraining economic development and property rights, entering 
what are often seen as political thickets,77 or providing causes of 
action that may displace other legislative prerogatives granted 
to affected persons, such as state citizen suits to enforce state 
pollution control requirements.78 
Principally, subnational constitutional environmental 
rights are under-enforced because courts have not found them to 
be self-executing.  A constitutional provision is self-executing if 
it is “a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be 
enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced; and 
it is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles, 
without laying down rules by means of which those principles 
may be given the force of law.”79  Thus, a constitutional provision 
that is self-executing requires nothing more from the legislature.  
A constitutional provision that is not self-executing requires 
implementing legislation to enforce. 
In the United States, few state constitutions make clear 
whether constitutionally-embedded fundamental environmental 
rights are self-executing.  Montana’s, Pennsylvania’s, and Rhode 
Island’s Constitutions, for example, are silent about whether 
their environmental rights are self-executing.  Constitutions 
from other states explicitly require subsequent legislative or 
judicial action.  The environmental rights provisions embedded 
in Hawaii’s and Illinois’s Constitutions, for example, are 
enforceable by “[a]ny person . . . through appropriate legal 
proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as 
provided by law.”80  Massachusetts’s environmental rights 
 
77. See A. E. Dick Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 
VA. L. REV. 193, 194 (1972); McLaren, supra note 76 at 132; Thompson, 
Montana’s Environmental Provisions, supra note 16, at 174; see generally 
James R. May & Erin Daly, Vindicating Fundamental Environmental Rights 
Worldwide, 11 OR. REV. INT’L. L. 365 (2009) (finding that obstacles to enforcing 
state constitutional environmental rights are strikingly similar to those that 
afflict enforcement of environmental rights provisions in national constitutions 
worldwide).  
78. See James R. May, The Availability of State Environmental Citizen 
Suits, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 53, 53-56 (2004). 
79. Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, 
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 99 (8th ed. 1927)); 
see Cusack, supra note 29. 
80. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2; but cf. Cusack, supra 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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provision seems to assume judicial action without requiring 
intervening legislative action.81 
The constitutions of some states in the U.S. contain a 
parallel provision that imposes a duty upon the state to enact 
laws to protect the environment, which suggests to some that 
corresponding environmental rights provisions are not self-
executing.82  For instance, Rhode Island’s Constitution provides 
that, “it shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for 
the conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral 
and other natural resources of the state,”83 and Michigan’s that 
“[t]he Legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, 
water and other natural resources of the state from pollution, 
impairment and destruction.”84  Some see the mandatory “shall” 
as requiring legislative action to effectuate constitutional 
environmental rights.85  Others see these provisions as merely 
invoking “moral force”86 that does not create a separately 
enforceable environmental right.87 
Most state court decisions have found constitutionally-
embedded provisions in state constitutions not to be self-
enforcing.  For example, in Enos v. Secretary of Environmental 
Affairs,88 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that 
the constitutional right to clean air and water does not afford an 
independent means to challenge an agency’s decision to grant a 
permit to operate a sewage treatment plant under the 
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act.89  In Commonwealth 
v. Blair,90 a state court held that the same right to clean air and 
water does not provide a cognizable cause of action to gain access 
 
note 29, at 182 (opining that Hawaii’s provision is self-executing). 
81. MASS. CONST. art. XCVII (“The general court shall have the power to 
enact legislation necessary or expedient to protect such rights.”). 
82. See Howard, supra note 77, at 198; see also McLaren, supra note 76, 
at 133. 
83. R.I. CONST.  art. I, § 17 (emphasis added). 
84. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52 (emphasis added). 
85. Howard, supra note 77, at 199. 
86. Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION 165 (8th ed. 1927). 
87. Howard, supra note 77, at 200; see McLaren, supra note 76, at 133. 
88. Enos v. Sec’y of Envtl. Affairs, 731 N.E.2d 525 (Mass. 2000). 
89. Id. at 532. 
90. Commonwealth v. Blair, 805 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). 
21
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to water supply in violation of the Commonwealth’s Watershed 
Protection Act: “[t]he judge correctly rejected the argument that 
the Commonwealth is duty-bound to acquire interests related to 
the protection of drinking water.”91 
Moreover, state courts in the U.S. have held that state 
attorneys general could not even enforce environmental rights 
provisions absent implementing legislation.92  The leading case 
is Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 
in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the 
state’s attorney general could not enforce the state’s 
environmental rights provision without further grant of 
authority from the state legislature.93  The court reasoned that 
the provision did not grant the attorney general an unbridled 
and undefined authority to enforce a vague constitutional 
mandate to “natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values,”94 thus 
exposing individual property owners to enforcement 
consequences.95  Likewise, in State v. General Development 
Corp.,96 a court in Florida held that the state attorney could not 
enforce Florida’s constitutional “policy . . . to conserve and 
protect its natural resources and scenic beauty,”97 to prosecute 
unauthorized canal construction except under the auspices of 
“the legislature’s enactment of over twenty specific general laws 
that have explicitly given a state attorney the authority to 
independently initiate civil suits on behalf of the state in other 
areas concerning the health, safety, and welfare of Florida’s 
 
91. Id. at 1018. 
92. Some argue that such judicial reluctance is anathema to the core ideas 
these provisions were designed to promote. See, e.g., McLaren, supra note 76, 
at 135. 
93. Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 
588, 594-95 (Pa. 1973). 
94.  Id. at 595. 
95.  Id.  See, e.g., Cmty. Coll. of Del. Cty. v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 482 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1975) (in which the court noted that “while [Pennsylvania’s 
environmental rights clause] may impose an obligation upon the 
Commonwealth to consider the propriety of preserving land as open space, it 
cannot legally operate to expand the powers of a statutory agency, nor can it 
expand the statutory powers of the [state agency] as a practical matter here.”). 
96.  State v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 448 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), 
aff’d, 469 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1985); see McLaren, supra note 76, at 134.  
97.  FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; see also McLaren, supra note 76, at 134. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/8
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citizens and environment.”98 
A few other cases suggest margin for judicial cognizance of 
subnational environmental constitutionalism.  The Supreme 
Court of Alaska recently read that state’s “public interest” 
constitutional standard for resource development to require that 
courts take a hard look at whether state agencies adequately 
considered the cumulative environmental impacts of oil and gas 
leases.99  And the Supreme Court of Montana has subjected that 
state’s environmental rights provision to strict scrutiny,100 
although it has since been reluctant to enforce it.101 
 
III. Case Study: Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights 
Amendment 
 
There are myriad ways to amend the New York State 
Constitution to advance environmental outcomes.  Chief among 
these is to have it recognize a right to a healthy environment.102  
Other proposals include those to have it limit greenhouse gas 
emissions, establish land banks, incorporate the public trust 
doctrine, provide a framework for regionalism and home rule, 
protect marine life and habitat, conserve aesthetic and cultural 
landscapes, adopting procedural protections and access to 
courts, and addressing specific threats, such as toxic 
substances.103 
Some suggest that Pennsylvania’s “Environmental Rights 
Amendment” is the leading example for consideration for 
environmental amendments to New York’s Constitution.104  The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which recently held that 
 
98.  Gen. Dev. Corp., 448 So. 2d at 1080. 
99.  Sullivan v. Resisting Envtl., Destruction, 311 P.3d 625 (Alaska 2013). 
100.  Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 
(Mont. 1999). 
101.  See, e.g., N. Plains Res. Council v. Mont. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 288 
P.3d 169 (Mont. 2012). 
102. See generally Robinson, supra note 6, at 179. 
103. Paul Bray, “Forever Wild” The Treatment of Conservation and the 
Environment by the New York State Constitution, in NEW YORK’S BROKEN 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 243, 249-56. 
104. See, e.g., William R. Ginsberg, The Environment, in THE NEW YORK 
STATE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEFING BOOK (Gerald Benjamin ed., 1994) 221, 221-
29; Robinson supra note 6, at 179-80. 
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individuals may enforce article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution – which both recognizes an individual right to a 
quality environment and requires the state to “conserve and 
maintain” public resources “for the benefit of all the people” —
against governmental agencies.105  In a remarkable decision, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejuvenated article I, section 27 of 
Pennsylvania’s Constitution.106  In Robinson Township v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court struck as unconstitutional major parts of “Act 13” —a 
state oil and gas law designed to promote “horizontal hydraulic 
fracturing,” or “hydro-fracking.”107  The decision has some 
important implications for environmental constitutionalism. 
Section 27 of the state constitution is no accident.  
Pennsylvania’s history includes improvident deforestation, 
significant loss of biodiversity and wildlife, rampant 
industrialization, and extensive surface and subsurface coal 
mining.  These activities have taken a significant toll on the 
quality of the environment in the state.  Accordingly, in 1971 by 
constitutional referendum, the people of Pennsylvania adopted 
the “environmental rights amendment” by a four-one margin.  
Incorporated as article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, it provides: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, 
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, 
historic and esthetic values of the 
environment.  Pennsylvania’s public natural 
resources are the common property of all the 
people, including generations yet to come.  As 
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth 
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit 
of all the people.108 
The environmental rights amendment affords rights and 
imposes public trust duties that are commensurate with other 
 
105. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013), aff’d, 
84 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2014), and aff’d in part, rev’d on other grounds, 147 A.3d 536 
(Pa. 2016). 
106. Id.  
107. Id. at 1001-02.  
108. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
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constitutional prerogatives: “It is not a historical accident that 
the Pennsylvania Constitution now places citizens’ 
environmental rights on par with their political rights.”109  Act 
27 was enacted based on “the mischief to be remedied and the 
object to be attained,” namely, to address environmental 
degradation in the state by promoting individual environmental 
rights and requiring governmental authorities to hold natural 
resources in public trust.110  Horizontal hydro-fracking, on the 
other hand, is a relatively new engineering technique that can 
be used to gain access to the natural gas and petroleum 
embedded in deep shale “plays” a mile or deeper under the 
surface of the earth.111  The Pennsylvania legislature enacted 
Act 13 in 2012 to promote the development of the state’s 
extensive “Marcellus Shale” play.112 
Act 13 constituted a major revision to the state’s 
longstanding Oil and Gas Act in several respects.  First, it 
preempted traditional zoning and planning by local 
governments to regulate or ban hydrofracking by declaring that 
state laws “occupy the entire field” of oil and gas regulation, “to 
the exclusion of all local ordinances,” and thus, “preempt[s] and 
supersede[s] [the] “local regulation of oil and gas operations.”113  
Thus, local governments were not free to reach their own 
decisions about whether and to what extent to allow 
hydrofracking or to impose additional environmental 
requirements. 
Second, Act 13 required local governments to promote 
hydrofracking, regardless of the wishes of their constituents or 
concerns about potential adverse environmental effects.114  It 
mandated that all local ordinances regulating oil and gas 
operations “allow . . . for the reasonable development of oil and 
gas resources,” and established strict time periods for local 
review of proposals, wherein if not kept, the project was deemed 
approved.115  While Act 13 prohibited drilling or disturbing areas 
 
109. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 960. 
110. Id. at 959.  
111. Id. at 914-15.  
112. Id. at 915. 
113. Id. at 970.  
114. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 971.  
115. Id. at 970. 
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within specific distances of underground sources of drinking 
water, streams, springs, wetlands, and other water bodies, it 
required state environmental agencies to waive these 
restrictions provided the developer submits “additional 
measures, facilities or practices” to protect these waters.116  Act 
13 also established a system to collect and allocate “impact fees” 
designed to offset some of hydrofracking’s adverse 
environmental effects.117  Thus, Act 13 essentially conscripted 
local governments into the service of promoting state policy 
prerogatives, which themselves reflected the goals of the oil and 
gas industry. 
Last, Act 13 prevented physicians from obtaining 
information about the risks of exposure to certain chemicals 
used in hydro-fracking unless they agreed to sign a 
confidentiality agreement.118  It then subjected physicians who 
released information about potential chemical exposure to civil 
and criminal liability.119 
Seven municipalities, an environmental organization, and a 
physician challenged the constitutionality of Act 13 on a variety 
of grounds, including as an affront to both section 27 and federal 
and state substantive due process.120 
In response, the state argued that section 27 is 
unenforceable.  It based its theory on an earlier case, Payne v. 
Kassab, which held that section 27 “recognizes or confers no 
right upon citizens and no right or inherent obligation upon 
municipalities; rather, the constitutional provision exists only to 
guide the General Assembly, which alone determines what is 
best for public natural resources, and the environment 
generally, in Pennsylvania.”121 
While agreeing with the state’s interpretation of Act 27, the 
 
116. Id. at 972-73.  
117. Id. at 933. 
118. Id. at 924. 
119. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 924. 
120. Id. at 914. 
121. Id. at 942; see Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976); accord 
Klink v. Commonwealth, 370 A.2d 389 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).  For an 
informative discussion on the question of whether Pennsylvania’s amendment 
is self-executing, see John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution 
Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part II - Environmental Rights 
and Public Trust, 104 DICK L. REV. 97 (1999). 
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lower court declared Act 13’s statewide zoning provisions to be 
unconstitutional as a matter of substantive due process and 
struck the provisions of the law that required state agencies to 
grant waivers to setback requirements.122  It also held that the 
environmental plaintiffs and the physician lacked constitutional 
standing.123  Both sides appealed to the seven-member 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
The plurality determined that Act 13 contravenes section 
27’s remonstration that the state holds natural resources “in the 
public trust,” the court continued, “we agree with the citizens 
that, as an exercise of the police power, [Act 13 is] incompatible 
with the Commonwealth’s duty as trustee of Pennsylvania’s 
public natural resources.”124  It observed: “As the citizens 
illustrate, development of the natural gas industry in the 
Commonwealth unquestionably has and will have a lasting, and 
undeniably detrimental, impact on the quality . . . of 
Pennsylvania’s environment, which are part of the public 
trust.”125 
In particular, the plurality found that preempting local 
control over hydro-fracking “sanctioned a direct and harmful 
degradation of the environmental quality of life in these 
communities and zoning districts.”126  It also concluded that Act 
13 unconstitutionally shifted the burden to some citizens to bear 
“heavier environmental and habitability burdens than others” in 
violation of section 27’s mandate that public trust resources be 
managed for the benefit of all people.127  
A fourth judge concurred with the outcome, but would have 
overturned Act 13 as a violation of substantive due process 
rights of local communities because it would “force 
municipalities to enact zoning ordinances” despite 
“Pennsylvania’s extreme diversity,” noting that Act 13 did not 
afford adequate “consideration to the character of the 
 
122. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 484-85 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013), and aff’d in part, 
rev’d on other grounds, 147 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2016). 
123. Id. at 476-78. 
124. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 985. 
125. Id. at 975. 
126. Id. at 980. 
127. Id. 
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municipality,” including geology, topography, environmental 
quality, water supply, and economics.128 
Two justices dissented and would have upheld Act 13 and 
found that the environmental plaintiffs and the physician lacked 
standing.129  Another justice did not participate in the decision. 
A majority of the court also reversed the lower court’s 
finding that various environmental plaintiffs lack constitutional 
standing, ruling that they suffered “a substantial and direct 
interest in the outcome of the litigation premised upon the 
serious risk of alteration in the physical nature of their 
respective political subdivisions and the components of their 
surrounding environment.  This interest is not remote.”130  
Likewise, the majority upheld the standing of an affected 
physician to challenge Act’s 13’s confidentiality requirement, 
noting that such interests also were “substantial and direct,” 
and that “existing jurisprudence permits pre-enforcement 
review of statutory provisions in cases in which petitioners must 
choose between equally unappealing options and where the third 
option, here refusing to provide medical services to a patient, is 
equally undesirable.”131  The two justices who dissented would 
have upheld the lower court’s ruling that the environmental 
plaintiffs and the physician lacked standing.132 
The plurality’s opinion in Robinson Township reinforces 
environmental constitutionalism insofar as it represents an 
authentic attempt to engage the text of the environmental rights 
amendment.  First, it noted that section 27—much like many 
provisions that provide such rights—vests two rights in the 
people of the state.  The first is a right to clean air, pure water, 
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and 
esthetic values of the environment.133  The second is “a limitation 
on the state’s power to act contrary to this right.”134  Importantly, 
it held that these rights are equal in status and enforceability to 
 
128. Id. at 1006-08 (Baer, J., concurring).  
129. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1009-14 (Saylor, J., dissenting); id. at 
1014-16 (Eakin, J., dissenting). 
130. Id. at 922. 
131. Id. at 924.  
132. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
133. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 951. 
134. Id. 
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any other rights included in the state constitution, including 
property rights.135  
Second, it enforced the “public trust” provisions, that is, the 
obligations of the state to hold resources in the public trust for 
all people.136  Because the state is the trustee of these resources, 
the plurality held, it has a fiduciary duty to “conserve and 
maintain” them: “The plain meaning of the terms conserve and 
maintain implicates a duty to prevent and remedy the 
degradation, diminution, or depletion of our public natural 
resources.”137  
Thus, according to the plurality in Robinson Township, a 
constitutional requirement to hold resources in trust involves 
two separate obligations.  The first is “a duty to refrain from 
permitting or encouraging the degradation, diminution, or 
depletion of public natural resources.”138  The second takes due 
regard of present and future generations, and imposes a duty “to 
act affirmatively to protect the environment, via legislative 
action.”139  These duties promote “legitimate development 
tending to improve upon the lot of Pennsylvania’s citizenry, with 
the evident goal of promoting sustainable development.”140 
The plurality’s approach also minimized the role of 
balancing in environmental constitutionalism.  Specifically, the 
plurality rejected the “non-textual” balancing test in Payne v. 
Kassab as “inappropriate to determine matters outside the 
narrowest category of cases, i.e., those cases in which a challenge 
is premised simply upon an alleged failure to comply with 
statutory standards enacted to advance Section 27 interests.”141  
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania General Assembly will need to 
revise or scuttle Act 13. 
Last, the plurality in Robinson Township emphasized that 
the Environmental Rights Amendment serves both present and 
future generations.  Echoing sentiments from the majority 
opinion in Minors Oposa, it observed: “By any responsible 
 
135. Id. at 953-54. 
136. Id. at 957. 
137. Id. 
138. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957. 
139. Id. at 958. 
140. Id.  
141. Id. at 967. 
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account, the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale Formation will 
produce a detrimental effect on the environment, on the people, 
their children, and future generations, and potentially on the 
public purse, perhaps rivaling the environmental effects of coal 
extraction.”142  In so doing, the plurality opinion, in particular, 
advanced the purpose of the constitutional enshrinement of 
environmental rights and public trust duties in the first place: 
to promote environmental protection and advance individual 
rights to a quality environment. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Given the variety of subnational constitutional provisions 
aimed at protecting all facets of the environment in myriad 
ways, these textual and jurisprudential developments suggest 
that subnational environmental constitutionalism is a source of 
information, inspiration, and innovation at a constitutional 
convention for the State of New York. 
 
 
142. Id. at 976; see Minors Oposa v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res., 
G.R. No. 101083, 33 I.L.M. 173 (S.C., July 30, 1993) (Phil.). 
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